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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BECKER, Chief Judge. 
 
Defendant Lincoln Gumbs, a contractor in the United 
States Virgin Islands, entered into construction contracts 
with the Government of the Virgin Islands ("GVI") to 
renovate a hospital and a high school gymnasium in St. 
Thomas. The contracts were funded by a grant from the 
United States Department of the Interior to the GVI for 
capital improvement projects. To receive compensation for 
work performed under the contracts, Gumbs would submit 
to the GVI periodic requests for payment. The GVI would 
send these requests to the United States Department of the 
Interior, which would wire the funds to a GVI bank 
account. Gumbs in turn received payments in the form of 
checks drawn on the GVI's account. 
 
At issue here is Gumbs's submission to the GVI of 
requests for payment of $92,500 for bonding fees pursuant 
to the gymnasium contract, and $144,426 for the cost of a 
performance bond pursuant to the hospital contract. 
Gumbs, however, paid only $10,000 for the performance 
bond for the hospital contract, and had not paid any 
amount for performance bonds for the gymnasium contract. 
Gumbs was indicted on two counts of willfully causing a 
false claim to be made or presented to a federal department 
in violation of 18 U.S.C. S 2(b) and S 287.1 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Gumbs was also indicted on two counts of making false statements in 
a matter within the jurisdiction of a federal department in violation of 
18 
U.S.C. S 1001, but these counts were dismissed before trial. 
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Gumbs moved for judgment of acquittal at the close of 
the government's case pursuant to Rule 29(a) of the Federal 
Rules of Criminal Procedure, and renewed his motion at the 
close of trial. The District Court denied Gumbs's motion, 
and the jury convicted him on the two false claims counts. 
The District Court sentenced Gumbs to eighteen months on 
each count, to be served concurrently, and ordered him to 
pay $251,131 in restitution. Gumbs appeals from the final 
judgment of the District Court, which subsumes the 
District Court's denial of his motion for judgment of 
acquittal. 
 
This appeal requires us to determine the mens rea 
required for a defendant to be convicted of causing a false 
claim to be made or presented to a department of the 
United States, in violation of 18 U.S.C. S 2(b) and S 287. 
Gumbs submits that there was insufficient evidence that he 
knew that the contracts in question were federally funded, 
and that such knowledge is required before a defendant 
may be convicted under S 2(b) and S 287. The government 
responds that S 2(b) and S 287 do not require a defendant 
to know that he is causing a false claim to be presented to 
a federal department. 
 
Section 2(b) makes it a crime for a person to "willfully 
cause[ ] an act to be done which if directly performed by 
him . . . would be an offense against the United States." In 
general, for a defendant to be convicted under S 2(b), the 
government must prove two mens rea elements. First, the 
defendant must possess the mental state required by the 
underlying statute that the defendant caused another to 
violate, in this case S 287. Section 287 makes it a crime to 
"make[ ] or present[ ] . . . to any department [of the United 
States] . . . any claim upon . . . the United States, or any 
department or agency thereof, knowing such claim to be 
false, fictitious, or fraudulent." We conclude that the mens 
rea element of S 287 does not require a defendant who 
presents a false claim to the federal government to know 
that he is presenting the claim to the federal government. 
 
In addition to requiring a defendant to possess the mens 
rea required by the underlying statute, however,S 2(b) 
imposes the further mens rea requirement that a defendant 
"willfully" cause the act prohibited by the underlying 
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statute. More specifically, this additional mens rea element 
means that in a prosecution under S 2(b) andS 287, a 
defendant must willfully cause a false claim to be presented 
to the federal government. Although on its face, this 
willfulness requirement would seem to require a defendant 
who causes an intermediary to present a false claim to a 
federal department to know that the false claim will be 
presented to a federal department, the requirement that the 
false claim be presented to a federal department is a 
jurisdictional requirement, and the Supreme Court has 
held that a defendant generally need not be aware of the 
existence of a jurisdictional element to be guilty of a federal 
offense. See United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 672-73, 
696 (1975) (holding that knowledge that the intended victim 
is a federal officer is not an element of the crime under 18 
U.S.C. SS 111 and 371 of conspiracy to assault a federal 
officer engaged in the performance of official duties); see 
also United States v. Yermian, 468 U.S. 63, 75 (1984) 
(holding that to be guilty of making a false statement in a 
matter within the jurisdiction of a federal agency in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. S 1001, a defendant need not know 
that the statement was made in a matter within the 
jurisdiction of a federal agency). 
 
However, to be convicted of willfully causing an 
intermediary to present a false claim to a federal 
department, a defendant must at least know that he is 
causing the intermediary to present a false claim to 
someone, even if he does not know that the department to 
which he is causing the intermediary to present a false 
claim is in fact a federal department. Applying this 
standard to this case, we conclude that there is insufficient 
evidence from which a rational jury could find beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Gumbs knew that he was causing 
the GVI to make or present a false claim. In particular, 
there is no evidence that Gumbs knew that his contract 
was funded by anyone other than the GVI. We cannot 
uphold the conviction on some notion that it is generally 
known that all government contracts in the Virgin Islands 
are funded, at least in part, by the federal government. 
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Accordingly, we will reverse Gumbs's conviction and 




Gumbs was convicted under the federal False Claims Act, 
18 U.S.C. S 287, which provides that: 
 
       Whoever makes or presents to any person or officer in 
       the civil, military, or naval service of the United States, 
       or to any department or agency thereof, any claim 
       upon or against the United States, or any department 
       or agency thereof, knowing such claim to be false, 
       fictitious, or fraudulent, shall be imprisoned not more 
       than five years and shall be subject to a fine in the 
       amount provided in this title. 
 
The actus reus element of S 287 thus requires the 
defendant to present a claim to a "person or officer in the 
civil, military, or naval service of the United States," or a 
"department or agency" of the United States. 3 Since it is 
undisputed that Gumbs presented his claims for payment 
to the GVI, which is neither a "person or officer in the civil, 
military, or naval service of the United States," nor a 
"department or agency" of the United States, as defined in 
18 U.S.C. S 6, he did not commit the requisite actus reus to 
be convicted of directly violating S 287. 4 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The District Court had jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 18 
U.S.C. S 3241, and we have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
S 1291. In reviewing a guilty verdict for sufficiency of the evidence, we 
must affirm the defendant's conviction if, viewing the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the government, a rational jury could find beyond 
a reasonable doubt that the government proved all the elements of the 
offense. See United States v. Pressler, 256 F.3d 144, 149 (3d Cir. 2001). 
 
3. The actus reus element of a crime is the "wrongful deed that 
comprises the physical components of a crime and that generally must 
be coupled with mens rea to establish criminal liability." Black's Law 
Dictionary 37 (7th ed. 1999). 
 
4. The federal criminal code defines the terms"department" and "agency" 
as follows: 
 
       The term "department" means one of the executive departments 
       enumerated in section 1 of Title 5, unless the context shows that 
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Even though Gumbs did not directly violate S 287 
because he did not present a claim to a department or 
agency of the United States, he may still be guilty under 18 
U.S.C. S 2(b), which provides that "[w]hoever willfully 
causes an act to be done which if directly performed by him 
. . . would be an offense against the United States, is 
punishable as a principal." If there is sufficient evidence 
that Gumbs willfully caused the GVI to present a false 
claim to a department or agency of the United States, then 
his conviction must be affirmed under S 2(b) in combination 
with S 287. See United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 
U.S. 537 (1943) (upholding defendants' liability in a qui tam 
suit under the predecessor to S 287, which criminalized 
causing a fraudulent claim to be presented to the federal 
government, where the defendants presented fraudulent 
claims to local entities, who in turn presented the claims to 
the federal government); United States v. Catena , 500 F.2d 
1319 (3d Cir. 1974) (upholding a conviction underS 2(b) 
and S 287, where the defendant presented false Medicare 
claims to private insurance companies, who in turn 
presented the claims to the federal government). 5 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       such term was intended to describe the executive, legislative, or 
       judicial branches of the government. 
 
       The term "agency" includes any department, independent 
       establishment, commission, administration, authority, board or 
       bureau of the United States or any corporation in which the United 
       States has a proprietary interest, unless the context shows that 
       such term was intended to be used in a more limited sense. 
 
18 U.S.C. S 6. 
 
5. Although the government did not cite S 2(b) in the indictment, the 
indictment charged that Gumbs "knowingly and willfully made and 
presented and caused to be made and presented to the United States 
Department of the Interior . . . a claim upon and against the United 
States . . . knowing that such claim was false . . .." We held in Catena 
that such an indictment is sufficient to charge a violation of S 2(b) in 
tandem with S 287: 
 
       The text of each count [of the indictment] accused the defendant of 
       "presenting and causing to be presented" a false claim to an agency 
       of the United States. While the indictment did not by its terms 
refer 
       specifically to S 2(b), but rather referred only to S 287, this 
omission 
       is not fatal. 
 
500 F.2d at 1323 (internal alterations omitted). 
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Gumbs argues that to violate S 2(b) in conjunction with 
S 287, a defendant must know that he is causing a false 
claim to be presented to the federal government. See Hess, 
317 U.S. at 544-45 (noting that the predecessor toS 287, 
which criminalized causing a false claim to be presented to 
the federal government, "indicate[s] a purpose to reach any 
person who knowingly assisted in causing the[federal] 
government to pay claims which were grounded in fraud, 
without regard to whether that person had direct 
contractual relations with the [federal] government" 
(emphasis added)); Catena, 500 F.2d at 1323 n.7 ("[I]t 
would have been futile for the defendant to contend at trial 
that he did not know that the claim forms he sent to the 
carriers would ultimately be paid out of the federal 
treasury. The forms each contained the heading, in large 
letters, `Request for Medicare Payment,' and on the next 
line, `Medical Insurance Benefits -- Social Security Act.' "). 
Gumbs further cites cases from other circuits, identified in 
the margin, which affirmed convictions under S 2(b) and 
S 287 where it was clear that the defendant knew that he 
was causing an intermediary to present a false claim to the 
federal government.6 Accordingly, in Gumbs's submission, 
his conviction must be reversed because there is 
insufficient evidence that he possessed the requisite mens 
rea. 
 
The government responds that no showing that a 
defendant knew that the false claim would be submitted to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. See United States v. Murph, 707 F.2d 895, 896 (6th Cir. 1983) (per 
curiam) (affirming a conviction under S 287, where the defendant sold a 
false income tax return to a discounter and "knew when he sold the 
return to the discounter that the discounter was buying it for the 
purpose of presenting it to the government for a refund"); United States 
v. Blecker, 657 F.2d 629, 634 (4th Cir. 1981) (upholding defendant's 
conviction under S 2(b) and S 287 where"there was substantial evidence 
that [defendant] submitted invoices for hourly rates based on falsified 
resumes with knowledge that [the party to whom the claims were 
submitted] would seek reimbursement for the payment of the invoices 
from the GSA"); United States v. Beasley, 550 F.2d 261, 273-74 (5th Cir. 
1977) ("[W]e hold that false claims submitted to the state when the 
claimants knew that the state would rely on these claims for 
reimbursement from the federal government pursuant to a joint federal- 
state program fall within the federal false claims statute."). 
 
                                7 
  
the federal government is required under S 2(b) and S 287, 
citing United States v. Montoya, 716 F.2d 1340 (10th Cir. 
1983), which held that to be guilty of causing a false claim 
to be submitted to the federal government in violation of 
S 2(b) and S 287, a defendant need not know that the claim 
would ultimately be paid out of federal funds. Id. at 1344. 
However, the Supreme Court's decision in Hess  and our 
decision in Catena suggest that knowledge that the false 
claim will be paid from federal funds is necessary for a 
defendant to be convicted of causing a false claim to be 
presented to the federal government. Nonetheless, because 
the defendant knew that the claims would be paid out of 
federal funds in those cases, the Court did not have 
occasion to address squarely the question whether a 
conviction may be upheld under S 2(b) andS 287 where the 
defendant does not know that the claims presented will be 
paid out of federal funds. Given the absence of any binding 
authority directly on point, we turn to the general 
principles of criminal law underlying S 2(b) for guidance in 




Section 2(b) imposes liability on a defendant who does 
not himself commit the prohibited actus reus, but 
intentionally manipulates an innocent intermediary to 
commit the prohibited actus reus: 
 
       It is but to quote hornbook law to say that in every 
       crime there must exist a union or joint operation of act, 
       or failure to act, and intent. However, this is far from 
       suggesting that the essential element of criminal intent 
       must always reside in the person who does the 
       forbidden act. Indeed, the latter may act without any 
       criminal intent whatever, while the mens rea-- 
       "willfulness" -- may reside in a person wholly 
       incapable of committing the forbidden act. When such 
       is [the] case, as at bar, the joint operation of act and 
       intent prerequisite to commission of the crime is 
       provided by the person who willfully causes the 
       innocent actor to commit the illegal act. And in such a 
       case, of course, only the person who willfully causes 
       the forbidden act to be done is guilty of the crime. 
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United States v. Lester, 363 F.2d 68, 73 (6th Cir. 1966), 
quoted in United States v. American Investors of Pittsburgh, 
Inc., 879 F.2d 1087, 1095 (3d Cir. 1989). 
 
Consistent with these principles, we read S 2(b) as 
establishing two general mens rea elements. First, to be 
guilty under S 2(b), a defendant must possess the mens rea 
required by the underlying criminal statute that the 
defendant caused the intermediary to violate, in this case 
S 287. See United States v. Curran, 20 F.3d 560, 567 (3d 
Cir. 1994) ("Section 2(b) imposes criminal liability on those 
who possess the mens rea to commit an offense and cause 
others to violate a criminal statute."); see also United States 
v. Hsia, 176 F.3d 517, 522 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (holding that 
the mens rea element under S 2(b) requires proof of "the 
mens rea for the underlying offense"); United States v. 
Gabriel, 125 F.3d 89, 99 (2d Cir. 1997) ("Generally, to 
establish a conviction through the use of section 2(b), the 
government must prove that the defendant had the mental 
state necessary to violate the underlying criminal statute 
. . . ."). 
 
In addition to requiring the defendant to possess the 
mental state necessary to violate the underlying statute, 
S 2(b) also requires the defendant to possess the intent to 
cause the act prohibited by the underlying statute. This 
element arises from the explicit requirement inS 2(b) that 
the defendant "willfully" cause the prohibited actus reus. 
For example, in United States v. Curran, 20 F.3d 560 (3d 
Cir. 1994), we held that the mens rea element required 
under S 2(b) for causing a false statement to be made in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. S 1001 goes beyond the mens rea 
required by S 1001: 
 
       When proceeding under section 2(b) in tandem with 
       section 1001, the government must prove that a 
       defendant caused the intermediary to make false 
       statements. The intent element differs from that needed 
       when the prosecution proceeds directly under section 
       1001. The prosecution must not only show that a 
       defendant had the requisite intent under section 1001 
       (deliberate action with knowledge that the statements 
       were not true), but must also prove that he "willfully" 
       caused the false representations to be made. 
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Id. at 567-68; see also United States v. Barel, 939 F.2d 26, 
42 (3d Cir. 1991) (reversing a defendant's conviction under 
S 2(b) where "[t]he government did not produce any 
evidence to show [defendant] intended to cause[a third 
party] to breach a statutory duty"). 
 
To sum up, in a prosecution under S 2(b), the government 
must show the following mens rea elements: (1) that the 
defendant had the mens rea required by the underlying 
statute; and (2) that the defendant willfully caused the 
innocent intermediary to commit the act prohibited by the 
underlying statute. See United States v. Gabriel , 125 F.3d 
89, 101 (2d Cir. 1997) ("The most natural interpretation of 
section 2(b) is that a defendant with the mental state 
necessary to violate the underlying section is guilty of 
violating that section if he intentionally causes another to 
commit the requisite act." (emphasis omitted)); see also 
United States v. Hsia, 176 F.3d 517, 522 (D.C. Cir. 1999) 
("The natural reading of SS 2(b) and 1001 is this: the 
government may show mens rea simply by proof (1) that the 
defendant knew that the statements to be made were false 
(the mens rea for the underlying offense-- S 1001) and (2) 
that the defendant intentionally caused such statements to 
be made by another (the additional mens rea for S 2(b))."). 
We will therefore consider the substance of each of these 
general mens rea requirements in a prosecution under 




We first consider whether the mens rea required by S 287 
requires the defendant to know that the department to 
which the false claim is presented is a federal department, 
and conclude that it does not. First, the phrase"knowing" 
in S 287 is placed after the requirement that the false claim 
be submitted to a federal agency: "Whoever makes or 
presents . . . to any department or agency [of the United 
States], any claim . . . against the United States, or any 
department or agency thereof, knowing such claim to be 
false, fictitious or fraudulent, shall be imprisoned not more 
than five years . . . ." (emphasis added). This placement of 
the mens rea requirement indicates that a defendant may 
violate S 287 even if he does not know that the department 
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to whom he is presenting the false claim is a federal 
department. Cf. United States v. Yermian, 468 U.S. 63, 69 
(1984) ("[T]he statutory language [in 18 U.S.C. S 1001] 
makes clear that Congress did not intend the terms 
`knowingly and willfully' to establish the standard of 
culpability for the jurisdictional element of S 1001. The 
jurisdictional language appears in a phrase separate from 
the prohibited conduct modified by the terms `knowingly 
and willfully.' "). 
 
Moreover, the requirement in S 287 that the department 
to whom the false claim is presented be a federal 
department is jurisdictional in nature. Cf. Yermian, 468 
U.S. at 68 ("The statutory language [in 18 U.S.C. S 1001] 
requiring that knowingly false statements be made`in any 
matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency 
of the United States' is a jurisdictional requirement. Its 
primary purpose is to identify the factor that makes the 
false statement an appropriate subject for federal 
concern."). Generally, to be guilty of a federal offense, a 
defendant need not be aware of the existence of a 
jurisdictional element. See id. at 68-69 ("[T]he existence of 
the fact that confers federal jurisdiction need not be one in 
the mind of the actor at the time he perpetrates the act 
made criminal by the federal statute." (quoting United 
States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 676-77 n.9 (1975))). 
 
We therefore hold that the mens rea necessary for a 
direct violation of S 287 does not require knowledge that the 
party to whom the claim was presented is a federal 
department. See United States v. Montoya, 716 F.2d 1340, 
1345 (10th Cir. 1983) ("[I]gnorance of the federal presence 
does not negate the requisite mens rea for aS 287 violation 




As discussed above, however, S 2(b) requires a mens rea 
element in addition to that required by the underlying 
offense. In particular, S 2(b) requires that the defendant 
"willfully" cause an intermediary to commit the prohibited 
actus reus. This willfulness requirement means that in a 
prosecution for causing an intermediary to present a false 
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claim to a federal department, the defendant must at least 
have known that he was causing the intermediary to 
present a false claim. If a defendant simply presents a false 
claim, without any knowledge that the entity to whom the 
false claim is presented will in turn present the false claim 
to a third party, then the defendant cannot be said to have 
willfully caused the intermediary to commit the actus reus 
prohibited under S 287. 
 
Accordingly, we may uphold Gumbs's conviction only if 
there is sufficient evidence, when viewed in the light most 
favorable to the government, for a rational jury to conclude 
beyond a reasonable doubt that Gumbs knew that he was 
causing the GVI to make or present a false claim. Put 
differently, acquittal is required in this case unless there is 
sufficient evidence that Gumbs knew that the contract was 
actually funded by someone other than the GVI. 
 
We need not decide whether a defendant, to be convicted 
under S 2(b) in tandem with S 287 of causing an 
intermediary to present a false claim to a federal 
department, must know not only that he is causing the 
intermediary to present a false claim, but also that the 
party to whom the intermediary is presenting the claim is 
a federal department. Although the willfulness requirement 
of S 2(b) appears on its face to require the defendant to have 
knowingly caused each element of the actus reus  prohibited 
by the underlying statute, including the requirement under 
S 287 that the false claim be submitted to the federal 
government, mens rea requirements generally do not extend 
to the jurisdictional element of the actus reus , as discussed 
above. See United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 672-73, 
696 (1975) (holding that knowledge that the intended victim 
is a federal officer is not an element of the crime under 18 
U.S.C. SS 111 and 371 of conspiracy to assault a federal 
officer engaged in the performance of official duties); see 
also United States v. Yermian, 468 U.S. 63, 75 (1984) 
(holding that to be guilty of making a false statement in a 
matter within the jurisdiction of a federal agency in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. S 1001, a defendant need not know 
that the statement was made in a matter within the 
jurisdiction of a federal agency). 
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At all events, as discussed below, there is insufficient 
evidence that Gumbs knew that his contract was funded by 
anyone other than the GVI, and therefore insufficient 
evidence that he knew that he was causing the GVI to 
present a false claim. Thus, we hold only that to violate 
S 2(b) in conjunction with S 287 by willfully causing an 
intermediary to present a false claim to a federal 
department, a defendant must know at least that he is 
causing the intermediary to submit a false claim. 
Accordingly, we reserve the question whether such a 
defendant must also know that the party to whom he is 





Having concluded that a defendant may be convicted of 
causing an intermediary to present a false claim to the 
federal government in violation of S 2(b) andS 287 only if 
the defendant knows that he is causing the intermediary to 
submit a false claim, we turn to whether there is sufficient 
evidence to support Gumbs's conviction in this case. 
However, we find no evidence in the record that Gumbs had 
any knowledge that the contracts in question were funded 
by anyone other than the GVI. There is therefore no 
evidence from which a rational jury could conclude beyond 
a reasonable doubt that Gumbs knew that he was causing 
the GVI to submit a false claim. 
 
The government relies on Gumbs's testimony that he has 
been a building contractor since 1966, and that he had 
done "a lot of government projects." In particular, between 
1989 and 1992 Gumbs had approximately $15 million 
worth of contracts. But the mere fact that Gumbs was an 
experienced government contractor is inadequate to 
establish beyond a reasonable doubt that he knew that his 
contract was funded by someone other than the GVI. Even 
the most experienced contractor need not know that a 
contract with the Virgin Islands is funded by a third party 
unless there is some concrete indicia of third-party funding. 
While it may be that nearly all government contracts in the 
USVI are federally funded, this fact is not capable of 
judicial notice under Federal Rule of Evidence 201(b), since 
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it is neither "generally known within the territorial 
jurisdiction of the trial court," nor "capable of accurate and 
ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy 
cannot reasonably be questioned." 
 
The government argues that the contracts provided that 
"[t]he Work shall be done under the direct supervision of 
the Government, and in accordance with the laws of the 
Government and its Rules and Regulations thereunder 
issued and any and all applicable federal rules and  
regulations."7 But it cannot be inferred beyond a reasonable 
doubt from this provision that Gumbs knew that the 
contract was federally funded. This provision simply 
reminds contractors of their duty to comply with federal 
rules and regulations such as OSHA and antidiscrimination 
laws, and could be included in both federally funded 
contracts and nonfederally-funded contracts alike. While it 
may be that such language is unnecessary, insofar as 
federal rules and regulations apply of their own force, it is 
nonetheless customary to include such clauses in 
contracts, regardless of their source of funding. 
 
That the contractual provision requiring contractors to 
comply with federal law provides insufficient evidence for a 
reasonable jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the contract was federally funded is illustrated by the fact 
that the contractual provision also reminds contractors of 
their duty to comply with the laws of the GVI. By the 
government's logic, a rational jury could therefore infer 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the contract was funded by 
the GVI. But the hospital contract, which included this 
provision requiring the contractor to comply with the laws 
of the GVI, was 100% funded by federal money. Thus, 
where a contract requires the contractor to comply with the 
law of a given sovereign, it cannot be inferred beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the contract is funded by that 
sovereign. 
 
In sum, there was insufficient evidence, even when 
viewed in the light most favorable to the government, from 
which a rational jury could conclude beyond a reasonable 
doubt that Gumbs knew that he was causing the GVI to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. The contracts define "Government" as the GVI. 
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make or present a false claim. Accordingly, we will reverse 
Gumbs's conviction and remand with instructions to enter 
a judgment of acquittal. See Burks v. United States, 437 
U.S. 1, 18 (1978) ("[T]he Double Jeopardy Clause precludes 
a second trial once the reviewing court has found the 
evidence legally insufficient . . . .").8 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. We acknowledge that this result is unfortunate, since Gumbs will 
escape punishment even though a jury found that he intentionally 
defrauded the GVI, and as a result obtained federal taxpayer dollars to 
which he was not entitled. In the future, however, the GVI and other 
entities that receive federal funding can avoid this result by including a 
clause in contracts notifying contractors that the contract is federally 
funded and that any claims presented pursuant to the contract will be 
presented to the federal government, thus subjecting the contractors to 
criminal penalties under the federal False Claims Act. Moreover, the 
federal government could require grant recipients, such as the GVI, as a 
condition on the receipt of the grant, to include such a provision in 
contracts funded by the grant, as is required of states in the Medicaid 
and Medicare context. See 42 C.F.R. S 457.950(b)(2) ("A State that makes 
payments to fee-for-service entities under a separate child health 
program must . . . [e]nsure that fee-for-service entities understand that 
payment and satisfaction of the claims will be from Federal and State 
funds, and that any false claims may be prosecuted under applicable 
Federal or State laws . . . ."). 
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